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We prove the unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocols using attenuated laser
pulses with M different linear polarizations. When M = 4, the proof covers the so-called SARG04
protocol [V. Scarani et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004)], which uses exactly the same quantum
communication as the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol. For a channel with transmission η, we show
that the key rate in SARG04 scales as O(η3/2). When we increase the number of states toM = 2k−1
or 2k, the key rate scaling improves as O(η(k+1)/k).
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.67.-a
Information encoded on the polarization of a single
photon is strongly affected by the law of quantum me-
chanics, and can be used to grow a shared random bit
sequence (secret key) between two remote parties with
negligible leak to an eavesdropper. The first protocol of
this quantum key distribution (QKD) was proposed by
Bennett and Brassard [1], and is called the BB84 proto-
col. A practically important and rather surprising fact is
that the QKD is still possible [2] even if we encode the
information on an attenuated laser pulse, which might
be regarded as a classical object. One drawback in us-
ing such a practical light source is the decrease of the
efficiency when we take the channel loss into considera-
tion [3, 4]. For a channel with transmission η, the secure
key rate in the BB84 protocol scales as O(η2) instead
of naively expected O(η) dependence. The reason of this
poor performance is that whenever the sender Alice emits
more than one photon, the eavesdropper Eve can keep
extra photons without introducing any detectable error.
In order to suppress this so-called photon number split-
ting (PNS) attack, Alice must attenuate her laser pulse
in proportion to η.
A number of possibilities have been studied to remedy
this performance drop. One solution is to switch to a
completely different protocol and implement the B92 pro-
tocol with a strong phase-reference pulse as in its original
proposal [5]. It was proved that this simple protocol us-
ing laser light achieves the key rate of O(η) [6]. Another
solution is to modify the quantum communication part
of the BB84 protocol to detect the PNS attack. This can
be done [7] by mixing the pulses (decoy states) with vari-
ous amplitudes in the protocol, and it was proved [8] that
the key rate of O(η) can be achieved with a large num-
ber of decoy states. A third possibility is the so-called
SARG04 protocol [9], which modifies only the classical
communication part of the BB84. Since the feasibility
of the BB84 with attenuated laser pulses has been re-
peatedly tested experimentally in the past decade, the
SARG04 protocol has its unique practical importance.
What we know about its security so far is the follow-
ing. Tamaki and Lo have analyzed [10] a protocol which
is the SARG04 augmented with decoy states, and have
shown that unconditionally secure key can be extracted
from the two-photon emission part. For the unmodified
SARG04 with its original spirit, Branciard et al. derived
O(η3/2) dependence of the key rate assuming a limited
set of individual attacks by Eve [11].
In this paper, we prove the security of the SARG04
protocol and its natural generalization toM -state proto-
cols with no condition on the attack by an eavesdropper.
We show a lower bound on the key rate in the SARG04
protocol scaling as ∼ αη3/2, where α is a factor depend-
ing on the bit error rate. For M(> 4) states, the expo-
nent improves to O(η(k+1)/k) with k = ⌈M/2⌉, while the
requirement for the bit error rate becomes severer as k
increases. For the security proof, we use the 2M -fold dis-
crete rotational symmetry of the system to simplify the
argument. For a light source with any photon-number
distribution, the protocol can be reduced to an entangle-
ment based protocol with Hilbert space H ∼= CM ⊗ C2.
The whole space H can be further divided into M qubits
according to the angular momentum. Then we can use a
standard analysis to obtain the security proof.
We consider the following protocols specified by two
integers (M,L) with 2L ≤ M . Alice prepares system C
in a linearly polarized, phase-randomized state of light,
which is written as
ρˆ(θ) ≡
∑
n
µn|θ, n〉CC〈θ, n|,
|θ, n〉C ≡ 2−n/2(n!)−1/2(eiθaˆ†−1 + e−iθaˆ†1)n|vac〉C ,
where aˆk is the annihilation operator for a circularly po-
larized photon with angular momentum k, and µn stands
for the photon number distribution. The angle θ is cho-
sen from the set ΩM ≡ {πl/M : l = 0, . . . ,M − 1}. Alice
encodes her randomly chosen bit a in the following way.
She chooses an integer j(0 ≤ j ≤ M − 1) randomly, and
sends ρˆ(aΘ+ πj/M) to Bob, where
Θ ≡ πL/M.
2The receiver Bob analyzes the polarization of the re-
ceived light by a polarization beam splitter (PBS) fol-
lowed by two photon detectors D1 and D2. The whole
analyzer is rotated by a randomly chosen angle θ′ ∈ ΩM ,
such that the light in state ρˆ(θ′) would be directed to
D1 and never to D2. We assume that the dark counts
and the inefficiency of the detectors can be equivalently
described by a noise source in the channel, and hence we
treat them as ideal detectors. We say an event is ‘de-
tected’ when D1 and D2 register exactly one photon in
total, implying that the incoming state is found in the
two-dimensional Hilbert space HB of a single photon.
Bob announces when the event is detected, and records
the rate ηd of detected events, which we call the detection
rate. After Bob receives the light, Alice announces the
value of j. Bob’s measurement determines a conclusive
value for his bit b only when (a) D1 registers no pho-
tons and D2 registers one photon, and (b) the analyzer
angle satisfies θ′ = Θ + πj/M (b = 0 in this case) or
θ′ = πj/M (b = 1). Let |k〉B ∈ HB(k = 1,−1) be the
state of a single photon with angular momentum k, and
define |ξθ¯〉B ≡ (eiθ| − 1〉B − e−iθ|1〉B)/
√
2. Conditioned
on the value of j, the POVM elements Bˆ
(j)
b for conclusive
events (b = 0, 1) are given by Bˆ
(j)
0 = P (|ξΘ+pij/M 〉B)/M
and Bˆ
(j)
1 = P (|ξpij/M 〉B)/M , where P (|·〉) ≡ |·〉〈·|. Fi-
nally, Bob announces whether the event has been con-
clusive or not.
It will be obvious that the (M,L) = (4, 2) protocol
is essentially the BB84 protocol, in which the bit a is
encoded to orthogonal states (Θ = π/2). The SARG04
corresponds to (4, 1) and the bit is encoded to nonorthog-
onal states (Θ = π/4), which is the crux of the protocol.
The security proof begins with the introduction of a
virtual system A with M -dimensional Hilbert space HA.
We take a basis {|2k〉A}k=0,...,M−1 and assume that the
state |2k〉A has angular momentum 2k. Let us define
|Φn〉AC ≡
√
2−nn!
n∑
k=0
[k!(n− k)!]−1
|2(k modM)〉A ⊗ (aˆ†1)n−k(aˆ†−1)k|vac〉C
and let ρˆAC ≡
∑
n µnP (|Ψn〉AC). This state is invariant
under the rotation of systems AC by discrete angles θ ∈
ΩM . Let us define another orthonormal basis {|ξθ〉A}(θ ∈
ΩM ) by
|ξθ〉A ≡M−1/2
M−1∑
k=0
e−2ikθ|2k〉A.
It is straightforward to see that A〈ξθ|ρˆAC |ξθ〉A = ρˆ(θ) for
θ ∈ ΩM . Therefore, it makes no difference if Alice pre-
pares ρˆAC , sends system C to Bob, and then determines
(a, j) by a measurement with POVM Aˆa,j ≡ P (|ξθ〉A)/2
with θ = aΘ+ πj/M just before the announcement of j.
With this modification, every case in the detected
events are regarded as an outcome of a measurement on
HA ⊗HB. For example, conclusive events correspond to
the operator Rˆcon ≡
∑
j(Aˆ0,j + Aˆ1,j) ⊗ (Bˆ(j)0 + Bˆ(j)1 ),
and the events with a bit error (a 6= b) to Rˆbit ≡∑
j(Aˆ0,j ⊗ Bˆ(j)1 + Aˆ1,j ⊗ Bˆ(j)0 ). The summation over j
implies that these operators are invariant under the dis-
crete rotations ΩM . Hence, these should take the form of⊕M−1
k=0 sˆk, where sˆk acts on the Hilbert spaceHk spanned
by |0〉k ≡ |2k〉A|1〉B and |1〉k ≡ |2(k+1 modM)〉A|−1〉B,
the states with total angular momentum 2k + 1 (mod
2M). Let us introduce the identity 1ˆk and Pauli opera-
tors Xˆk ≡ |0〉kk〈1|+ |1〉kk〈0|, Zˆk ≡ |0〉kk〈0|− |1〉kk〈1| for
the qubit Hk. Then, we can simply express the operators
as
Rˆcon = M
−1
M−1⊕
k=0
(1ˆk − cos2ΘXˆk),
Rˆbit = (2M)
−1
M−1⊕
k=0
(1ˆk − Xˆk). (1)
The next step is to describe Bob’s measurement Bˆ
(j)
b as
a filter followed by an ideal measurement on a qubit, as
in the security proof of the B92 [12]. Consider a vir-
tual qubit D with z basis {|0z〉D, |1z〉D} and x basis
{|0x〉D, |1x〉D}, where |bx〉D ≡ (|0z〉D + (−1)b|1z〉D)/
√
2.
Define an operator Fˆ (j) : HB → HD by
Fˆ (j) =
√
2/M [sin(Θ/2)|1x〉DB〈ξ(Θ+pi)/2+pij/M |
+ cos(Θ/2)|0x〉DB〈ξΘ/2+pij/M |].
Since Bˆ
(j)
b = Fˆ
(j)†|bz〉DD〈bz|Fˆ (j) holds, Bob’s measure-
ment can be regarded as the filtering process described
by Kraus operator Fˆ (j), which tells whether the event
is conclusive, followed by z-basis measurement on qubit
D, which gives the bit value b. To prove the security, we
are interested in what would happen if Bob measured the
qubit on x basis, and how Alice could predict the out-
come of that measurement. Bob’s x-basis measurement
corresponds to the operator Bˆ
′(j)
b ≡ Fˆ (j)†|bx〉DD〈bx|Fˆ (j)
acting on HB. In order to predict the outcome, Alice
could measure {Aˆ′a,j} instead of {Aˆa,j}, where Aˆ′a,j ≡
P (eiϕ|ξpij/M 〉A − (−1)ae−iϕ|ξΘ+pij/M 〉A)/4. Here ϕ is a
parameter we can freely choose. Since Aˆ0,j + Aˆ1,j =
Aˆ′0,j + Aˆ
′
1,j , this change of measurement does not af-
fect the announcement of j. The “phase error” event
where Alice’s prediction fails (a 6= b) corresponds to the
operator Rˆph ≡
∑
j Aˆ
′
0,j ⊗ Bˆ′(j)1 + Aˆ′1,j ⊗ Bˆ′(j)0 , which
is again rotationally invariant. After some algebra with
3ϕ′ ≡ ϕ+ (Θ/2), we can express it as
Rˆph =
1
2M
M−1⊕
k=0
(
cos 2(kΘ+ ϕ′)(cos2Θ1ˆk − Xˆk)
+(1/2) sin 2Θ sin 2(kΘ+ ϕ′)Zˆk
)
+ Rˆcon/2. (2)
The rest of the task is to consider how we can esti-
mate the number of the phase errors from the actually
observed quantities. For that purpose, we consider the
real protocol and a virtual protocol, both of which look
identical in Eve’s point of view. Suppose that there are
3N detected events for simplicity (The argument is the
same for N + o(N) instead of 3N). Alice and Bob ran-
domly group these into three sets of N events. For the
first one, Alice measures the angular momentum of sys-
tem A in the virtual protocol. In the real protocol, she
refrains from disclosing j and just discards the events.
Let r2k be the relative frequency (number of events di-
vided by N) of the outcome 2k. For the second group,
Alice and Bob together measure the bit error Rˆbit in ei-
ther of the protocols. Let rerr be its relative frequency.
For the third group, from which they try to extract the
key, Alice and Bob obtain rconN conclusive bits in the
real protocol. Let rbitN be the number of errors in these
bits. In the virtual protocol, they measure Rˆph and de-
termine its relative frequency rph.
Thanks to the random grouping, rbit = rerr in the
limit of N → ∞ (more precisely, for any ǫ0 > 0, the
probability of |rbit − rerr| > ǫ0 is exponentially small in
the limit). Further, as in [12], there must be a state
ρˆ ≡ ⊕k pkρˆk, where ρˆk is a normalized density oper-
ator acting on Hk, such that Tr[ρˆ|2k〉AA〈2k|] = r2k,
Tr[ρˆRˆbit] = rbit, Tr[ρˆRˆcon] = rcon, and Tr[ρˆRˆph] = rph.
Let us write Xk ≡ Tr(ρˆkXˆk) and X ≡
∑
k pkXk. The
quantity X can be determined from the observed value
rerr or rcon through the relations resulting from Eqs. (1),
2Mrbit = 1−X, Mrcon = 1−X cos2Θ. (3)
Note that we can omit the measurement of rerr un-
less Θ = π/2. Using Eq. (2) and the relation X2k +
Tr(ρˆkZˆk)
2 ≤ 1, we obtain
rph ≤ rcon
2
+
1
2M
∑
k
pkf2(kΘ+ϕ′)(Xk), (4)
where
fφ(x) ≡ cosφ(cos2Θ− x) + 1
2
sin 2Θ| sinφ|
√
1− x2.
It is seen that if cos 2(kΘ+ϕ′) ≤ 0, the phase error con-
tribution from Hk is too high even if Xk = 1 (no bit
errors). We thus should choose ϕ′ such that the contri-
bution from such “bad” subspaces is minimized. Finally,
we derive an inequality from the fact that Eve cannot
touch system A directly. Even though Eve may freely
choose which events should be detected, {r2k} must still
satisfy r2k ≤ η−1d Tr[ρˆAC |2k〉AA〈2k|], which leads to
pk(1 −
√
1−X2k) + pk−1(1−
√
1−X2k−1)
≤ 2η−1d Tr[ρˆAC |2k〉AA〈2k|], (5)
where p−1 ≡ pM−1. An upper bound r¯ph of rph can
thus be calculated from the observed quantities X and
ηd by taking the maximum of the rhs (right-hand side)
of Eq. (4) over {pk, Xk}, under the constraints of Eq. (5)
and X =
∑
k pkXk.
Now the situation is summarized as follows. Alice and
Bob have rconN conclusive bits with rerrN errors. Bob’s
bits can be regarded as outcomes of z-basis measurements
on rconN qubits, and if he had measured those qubits on
x-basis, Alice could have predicted the outcomes with at
most r¯phN errors. Then, by the argument in [13], we can
extract an unconditionally secure secret key of length
GN = Nrcon[1− h(rerr/rcon)− h(r¯ph/rcon)],
where h(x) ≡ −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x). We can also
derive the same key rate by assuming virtual qubits in
Alice’s side and invoking Shor-Preskill argument [14].
Using the general prescription derived above, here
we concentrate on the most interesting case, the high
channel-loss limit (η → 0) when Alice uses an attenu-
ated laser source with mean photon number µ, namely,
µn = e
−µµn/n!. For a fair comparison of various pro-
tocols, we assume that, in addition to the transmission
η, the channel applies a random rotation of polarization
with probability ǫ. This results in the observed quantities
X = 1−ǫ and ηd = µη in the limit η → 0. LetK be a pos-
itive integer satisfying K ≤M − 2 and 2L(K − 1) < M ,
namely, cos(K − 1)Θ > 0. We will show that by setting
µ = (γη)1/K , the key gain of O(η(K+1)/K) is achievable
in the high-loss limit η → 0, when ǫ is small enough.
Consider the limit η → 0 with µ = (γη)1/K . For k =
K + 1, the rhs of Eq. (5) converges to ζKγ, where ζK ≡
[2K(K + 1)!]−1 is a constant. Hence, when K = M − 2,
we have
pM−1(1−
√
1−X2M−1)+pK(1−
√
1−X2K) ≤ ζKγ. (6)
When K ≤ M − 3, either pk = 0 or Xk = 0 holds for
k = K+1, · · · ,M−1 since the rhs of Eq. (5) vanishes for
k ≥ K +2. Therefore, Eq. (6) still holds, and the contri-
butions from HK+1, · · · ,HM−2 is not significant. On the
other hand, there are no bounds for H0, · · · ,HK−1. We
thus choose ϕ′ = −(K − 1)Θ/2, making these subspaces
“good” ones.
Let us divide X into two contributions as X = qX ′ +
(1 − q)X ′′, where the first term is from HK and HM−1,
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FIG. 1: (a) Key gain G of SARG04 in the high channel loss
limit η → 0. (b) The same for the (5, 1) and the (6, 1) proto-
col. (c) Threshold channel noise ǫ for achieving O(η(K+1)/K)
scaling of the key gain.
namely, q ≡ pK+pM−1 and qX ′ ≡ pKXK+pM−1XM−1.
Then, from Eq. (6), we have
q(1−
√
1−X ′2) ≤ ζKγ, (7)
and Eq. (4) becomes
M(2rph − rcon) ≤ qf(K+1)Θ(X ′) + (1− q)f(X ′′), (8)
where f(x) is defined as the boundary of the convex hull
of the union of regions below f(K−1)Θ(x), f(K−3)Θ(x), . . .,
(fΘ(x) or f0(x)). For the relevant case with small bit er-
rors (x being close to 1), f(x) coincides with f(K−1)Θ(x).
Let g(γ, ǫ) be the maximum of the rhs of Eq. (8) over
q,X ′, X ′′ under Eq. (7) and 1 − ǫ = qX ′ + (1 − q)X ′′.
The key gain G (per pulse) in the limit η → 0 is given by
G/η(K+1)/K ∼ γ1/Kβ(ǫ)M−1
×
[
1− h
(
ǫ
2β(ǫ)
)
− h
(
1
2
+ max{0, g(γ, ǫ)
2β(ǫ)
}
)]
, (9)
where β(ǫ) ≡Mrcon = 1− cos2Θ(1− ǫ). Since g(0, 0) =
f(K−1)Θ(1) < 0, the rhs of Eq. (9) is positive for suffi-
ciently small γ and ǫ. For a fixed M ≥ 4, K can be
as large as ⌈M/2⌉ when L = 1. Hence, the key gain
scales as O(η3/2) in the SARG04 protocol. The gain
after optimization over γ is shown in Fig. 1(a). When
ǫ = 0, the optimum intensity of Alice’s source scales as
µ ∼ 1.51η1/2. While the (5, 1) protocol and the (6, 1)
protocol both achieve O(η5/4) scaling, the latter proto-
col is better as shown in Fig. 1(b). In addition, we can
double the key gain of the protocols with evenM by sepa-
rately collecting and processing the events where D2 reg-
isters no photons and D1 registers one photon. Fig. 1(c)
shows the threshold noise ǫ below which the key gain of
O(η(K+1)/K) is achievable. It is seen that the require-
ment for the noises becomes tighter as the exponent im-
proves. This threshold depends only on Θ and not on
M , since the only dependence on M of the rate (9) is the
M−1 factor. The threshold is highest for approximately
Θ ∼ π/4(K − 1), which is achieved by the (4(K − 1), 1)
protocol.
In summary, we have proved the unconditional secu-
rity of the SARG04 protocol and shown that the key
gain scales as O(η3/2). A natural generalization was
given for the (M,L) protocols with M linearly polar-
ized states. When the channel noise is low, the (M, 1)
protocol can achieve the key gain of O(η(K+1)/K) with
K = ⌈M/2⌉. One might wonder why we do not achieve
K = M − 2, which is the bound due to the USD (un-
ambiguous state discrimination) attack [10, 15]. But
K = ⌈M/2⌉ is indeed optimal, because there is an at-
tack which is a kind of mixture of USD and PNS. For
example, if Alice emits 4 photons in the (6, 1) protocol,
Eve may apply a filter to the excess 3 photons to ob-
tain state [e3iθ(aˆ†−1)
3 + e−3iθ(aˆ†1)
3]|vac〉 with a nonzero
probability. She sends the remaining one photon to Bob
only when the filtering has been successful. It is then
obvious that Eve can always determine the bit a after
the announcement of j. It is not difficult to extend this
attack to larger values of M . One possible way to avoid
this kind of attack is to mix the protocols with different
values of L, which is just a modification of the classical
communication part.
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